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ABSTRACT
SHAREHOLDER ADVOCACY IN CORPORATE ELECTIONS:
CASE STUDIES IN PROXY VOTING WEBSITES FOR RETAIL INVESTORS

One of the key rights shareholders retain is the right to vote on issues affecting the
companies in which they invest. This voting right is seen as one of the primary means of
exercising diligent corporate governance (Cole 2003, Fairfax 2009). Only 28 percent of
individual investors vote in corporate elections compared with 91 percent of institutional
investors. Informed voting decisions at corporate elections can be very information
intensive, and theories of rational apathy and the free rider problem may explain a lack of
participation from individual investors.
Many shareholders cannot attend annual corporate meetings, so they can use the
proxy voting process. Several proxy voting websites have been launched to increase
engagement among individual investors in the voting process, but most have failed.
Through case study analysis of Moxy Vote, the United States Proxy Exchange and
ProxyDemocracy, this research identified major hurdles in regulatory constraints and
funding models and opportunities to engage progressive institutional investors and
millennials. This research also explores the link between shareholder voting and corporate
disclosure on climate change and sustainability.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Shareholder Advocacy
Shareholder advocacy, also known as shareholder activism, encompasses a range of
activities used to make change in a corporation, often as a reaction to underperforming
boards and management (de Tocqueville 2015). There exist a number of triggers that drive
shareholder activism including ineffective or misaligned strategy, poor risk management,
poor capital management, inadequate board member qualifications, and operational
mismanagement. The core goal of shareholder activism is to engage fellow shareholders
and the board of directors for the purpose to bringing about necessary changes to improve
performance and retain or grown shareholder value. It also tries to solve the fundamental
problem of the “divergence between ownership and control” that occurs because
shareholders entrust the control of their capital to corporate managers whose interest may
be different from shareholders (Cole 2003).
Research from Gillan and Starks (1998, 2007) shows that shareholder activism has
been in place since the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted
Rule 14a-8 in 1934. This rule allows shareholders who have held a minimum of $2,000
worth of company shares for at least a year to submit a shareholder proposal. Under this
rule, shareholders have the right under certain conditions to propose policies that must be
printed in a company proxy statement, distributed to all shareholders and voted on at the
annual shareholder meeting (Gilbert 1956). From 1934 to the mid-1980s, Gillan and Starks
(2007) found the shareholder proposal process was almost exclusively led by individual
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shareholders and religious or political groups. When public pension plan activism started
in 1985, institutional investors became increasingly more involved and now seem to
dominate the shareholder advocacy arena.
1.2 Shareholder Voting Rights
One of the key rights shareholders retain is the right to vote on issues affecting the
companies in which they invest. Investors are not required to vote, but voting one’s shares
is seen as one of the primary sources of power within a corporation and means of
exercising diligent corporate governance (Cole 2003, Fairfax 2009). The SEC views
corporate governance as key to maintaining a system of accountability among shareholders,
managers and the board of directors. The corporate governance process helps determine
the leadership, organization and direction of a company (SEC Office of Investor Education
and Advocacy 2015). Shareholder voting can also be used to influence company activities
related to sustainability and social responsibility (Ceres 2015, As You Sow 2015, Snow
and Cook 2011, Newlands 2015).
These voting rights give shareholders the power to elect directors at annual or
special meetings and make views known to company management and the board of
directors on significant issues that may have an affect on the value of the shares including
mergers and acquisitions (SEC Office of Investor Education and Advocacy 2015). Due to
the dispersed nature of shareholders, it can be difficult to amass the quorum needed to
conduct an election, and shareholders in the current era typically vote through proxy. The
proxy technically refers to the “shareholder’s grant of authority to a third party to case a
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vote on the shareholder’s behalf” (Fairfax 2009).
Regardless of the voting method, all shareholders who hold shares by a company’s
set record date receive notification of an upcoming election or meeting by one of three
ways: a notice either in the mail or electronically that proxy materials are available on the
Internet; a package containing a proxy card or voter information form (VIF), annual report,
and proxy statement; or a package containing an annual report and information statement
but no proxy card.
1.3 Types of Investors and Shareholders
Institutional investors are large organizations including mutual funds, pension
funds, labor unions or insurance companies, investment banks, commercial trusts,
endowment funds, and hedge funds that invest large amounts of money in the stock
exchange, typically on behalf of other people. Non-institutional investors, by definition,
are all other investors including anyone who buys and sells debt, equity or other
investments through a broker, bank, real estate agent or someone in a similar capacity.
Within non-institutional investors, there is a class of investors commonly referred to as
retail investors, who typically individual investors who actively trade stocks, mutual funds,
bonds and other securities and manage their own money to plan for retirement, save for
large purchases, or to pass on wealth to family members (Brunswick Group 2015). Some
firms only designate between institutional and retail investors, but it is important to note
that not all non-institutional investors are in reality retail investors. According to a recent
report from Broadridge and PwC (2015) recapping the 2015 proxy voting season and seen
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in figure 1, institutional investors held 68 percent of shares outstanding in U.S. public
companies where as retail investors owned 32 percent of shares outstanding (Broadridge
2015).

Figure 1. Historical Share Ownership. (Broadridge 2015)

Institutional investors vote at significantly higher rates than retail investors: 91
percent of institutional investors voted their shares in the 2015 season and only 28 percent
of retail investors voted their shares (see figure 2). This left more than 97 billion shares
unvoted during the 2015 proxy season. This is an important phenomenon in the United
States because of the dispersed nature of share ownership. As opposed to investment in
other countries, such as Hong Kong where companies are often privately held or public
companies have few owners, public companies in the United States are owned by many
different individuals and entities. In the case of proxy contests where companies may be
facing disputes about board members, shareholder proposals or mergers and acquisitions,
votes submitted by retail investors can indeed influence the final outcome.
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Figure 2. Historical Retail Investor Voting Rates. (Broadridge 2015)

1.4 Proxy Voting Websites
In the years leading up to and immediately following the financial crisis of 2008, a
few individuals and groups sought to use the Internet as a means of promoting shareholder1
participation in the proxy voting process (Bernard 2010). These ideas grew into several
different websites devoted to providing shareholders with more information about the
issues present on their proxy voting ballots and the ability to transact votes more efficiently.
Of the several websites that were created in the United States including Moxy Vote,
Sharegate.com, Shareowners.org, United States Proxy Exchange and ProxyDemocracy.org,
all but one site have effectively ceased operations.2 ProxyDemocracy.com, now owned by
the Sustainable Endowments Institute (SEI)3, is the only site that users can still access and
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
1

The terms shareholder and shareowner are used interchangeably throughout this paper, as are the references to

2

At the time this paper was written, Sharegate.com still has a website presence but its page indicates that the company is
“revisioning its product”.
3
Founded in 2005 as a special project of Rockefeller Philanthropy Advisors, Inc, the Sustainable Endowments Institute
(SEI) has pioneered research, education and outreach to advance resilient institutional responses to the climate crisis.
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where data is current and still actively being populated. Three case studies were completed
in this research focusing on two of these sites that failed—Moxy Vote and the United
States Proxy Exchange—and the one that still functions—ProxyDemocracy. The purpose
of the research is to learn from the failed sites for the strengthening and future viability of
ProxyDemocracy; in particular, to focus on the strengths and weaknesses of each operation
and how they related to relevant changes in Proxy Democracy. Next is a brief overview of
the three sites chosen for case study analysis.
Moxy Vote was a web-based platform founded in 2009 by leaders of TFS Capital,
an employee-owned independent advisory firm that provides portfolio management
services to investment funds. Moxy Vote’s headquarters were in West Chester,
Pennsylvania and at its peak the company employed ten staff members. Key to Moxy
Vote’s mission was providing a simple platform that allowed the free exchange of
information among shareholders, advocate groups, and public companies (Change.org
2012). Moxy Vote founders created the site to “give shareholders a voice in the
boardrooms of companies they own ”(Cheesman 2010). Moxy Vote allowed users, who
were predominately retail investors, to create customized voting profiles that aligned with
advice from advocate organizations, public companies and fellow shareholders. When an
annual shareholder meeting came up, Moxy Vote allowed the option to transact votes on
behalf of users according to their specified voting preferences. Moxy Vote essentially
provided the same electronic voting platform available to institutional investors through
firms such as Broadridge (though its “Proxy Edge” platform), Institutional Shareholder
Services and Glass Lewis. Moxy Vote gained a successful following with 197,000
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registered users and 56 advocate organizations posting proxy voting advice. Moxy Vote
ceased operations in 2012 because of regulatory barriers and funding challenges.
Glyn Holton, a financial risk consultant based in Cambridge, started the United
States Proxy Exchange (USPX) in 2004. USPX was a nonprofit organization with a
website presence at proxyexchange.org that helped train investors to file shareholder
resolutions themselves. Holton worked with lawyers to draft templates of letters and
resolutions that users could send to companies in which they invest. USPX ceased
operations in 2012 because of time constraints of its volunteer founder and manager.
The idea for ProxyDemocracy.org (ProxyDemocracy) began in 2004 when Andy
Eggers, at the time a research assistant at the Harvard Business School, took an interest in
the writings of Mark Latham. Latham’s ideas focus on technological solutions to the
problems of shareholders’ collective action (Eggers 2008c). Eggers took inspiration from
Latham’s vision that shareholders could elect a ‘corporate monitor’ that would paid with
by corporate funds, meaning that shareholders would all be collectively paying for this
service. The ‘corporate monitor’ would investigate the performance of the board and senior
management and report back to shareholders with the goal of reducing the free rider
problem inherent in proxy voting (Eggers 2008c). Early seeds of the project involved
volunteer help from Egger’s friends who were familiar with programming. When the
project proved concept, Eggers secured a small amount of funding to hire a professional
website developer (Eggers 2008b). In 2006, ProxyDemocracy was incorporated as a
nonprofit organization with an initial mission to “provide a set of tools to help investors
use their voting power to produce positive changes in the companies they own”
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(ProxyDemocracy.org 2008). The site gained popularity after its initial launch receiving
recognition for its innovative approach to engaging small shareholders. What Eggers
thought would be a brief before starting his doctoral studies turned into a website that still
functions today. The Sustainable Endowments Institute (SEI) acquired ProxyDemocracy in
2014, and SEI is currently exploring short and long-term options for the site’s future
developments.
2. Methodology
Research for this paper was completed in two stages: a literature review and the
composition of three case studies. To complete the literature review I consulted a body of
work in corporate law, shareholder advocacy, proxy voting, effects of the Internet on
voting behavior, and recent reports on the integration of environmental, social and
governance (ESG) data into investment decisions. This research was done primarily
through online research in LexisNexis, relevant journals, leading organizations and thought
leaders in the corporate governance field. I also consulted books on corporate governance
as well as blogs, newspaper articles and other informal sources.
The three case studies were completed through interviews and secondary research
on Moxy Vote, the United States Proxy Exchange and ProxyDemocracy.org. Although
there were several websites launched with similar missions of engaging retail investors in
the proxy voting process, many of these sites no longer function. The three sites were
chosen for cases study analysis because of the availability of information, access to users
who could provide relevant details, and the difference in their operational models. Moxy
Vote was a for-profit entity, USPX was completely volunteer driven, and ProxyDemocracy
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was historically its own nonprofit entity. Founders of Moxy Vote and
ProxyDemocracy.org were interviewed and consulted throughout the drafting of the case
studies which took place between August 2015 and January 2016. The interviews were
supplemented by a review of news articles, blog posts, social media and shareholder
forums to add to the narrative of the case studies. From these case studies, general
conclusions were drawn on the similarities and differences of the websites to develop
recommendations for ProxyDemocracy going forward.
Next is the literature review of the following areas: efficient information gathering
and proxy advisors, the effect of the Internet on proxy voting, rational apathy and the free
rider problem, and the linkages of proxy voting, corporate sustainability and climate
change.

3. Literature Review
3.1 Efficient Information Gathering and Proxy Advisors
Making informed voting decisions for corporate elections is an informationintensive activity. There are often many issues for vote on a corporate election ballot
including board of directors, CEO compensation, and a myriad of shareholder proposals.
The proxy voting process can be quite complex as shown by figure 3, which displays the
flow of proxy materials depending on the type of investor.
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Figure 3. The Flow of Proxy Materials. (Securities and Exchange Commission 2010)

Michael Schouten (2010) wrote about four key mechanisms of voting efficiency
including: informed voting, rational voting, independent voting and sincere voting. These
mechanisms often guide the ways that shareholders approach the effort they impart in
making their decisions. Institutional investors commonly rely on proxy advisory firms
including Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass Lewis to provide guidance on
how to vote on ballot issues. Schouten likens the corporate voting process to stock trading,
which also aggregates information on estimated values. Reducing information asymmetry
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is key to empowering shareholders to engage in corporate voting, but cost and legal
constraints can present major barriers (Schouten 2010). This means that there are trade-offs
inherent in how shareholders gather information to make decisions about corporate
elections.
Proxy advisory firms emerged from the need to solve these issues of information
asymmetry. There have been many firms who serve the role as proxy advisors but the two
dominant organizations are now ISS and Glass Lewis. Proxy Governance, Inc (PGI) closed
in 2010 citing that company responses to shareholder proposals are too often determined
by a desire or need to conform to the voting policies of the two main proxy advisors—ISS
and Glass Lewis—than to actually addressing the substance of shareholder concerns.
Barrall and Nathan (2011) question whether the opinions of these firms are based on a
thorough analysis of the facts and circumstances of each company they review in the
context of each voting decision. These firms are responsible for providing proxy research
and voting recommendations for tens of thousands of companies within a narrow window
of the proxy voting season each year (Barrall and Nathan 2011). The authors criticize the
opaque tendencies of proxy advisory firms in their methodology and the inability to test for
accuracy, consistency and value creation.
There exist proposals to reform disclosure requirements for proxy advisory firms to
include conflicts of interest and to disclose the fiduciary duty that these firms have to their
clients since they are technically investment advisors under the Advisors Act of 1940
(Edelan 2013). Proxy advisory firms receive compensation for their guidance from
companies who wish to provide information to their investors. Given many of these trends,
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there may be an opportunity for an organization to emerge that better serves the needs of
smaller institutional investors and individual investors.
3.2 Rational Apathy and the Free Rider Problem
As mentioned before, investors are not required to vote in corporate elections, but
this vote is a right given to investors in order to provide a way for shareholders to have a
voice, especially when they sense that the board and management may not be acting in the
best interest of shareholders and share value. The 2015 Broadridge proxy season wrap-up
shows that although retail investors own 32 percent of U.S. publically traded company
shares, they are only voting their shares 28 percent of the time (Broadridge 2015). This
section presents theoretical reasons why this rate is much lower than institutional investors
who vote their shares 91 percent of the time. The two main concepts are rational apathy
and the free rider problem.
Rational apathy refers to the situation where the cost to shareholders of informing
themselves about specific corporate issues and casting a vote in opposition of
management’s opinions exceeds the expected or actual benefit gained from voting (Fairfax
2009). If a shareholder acts in a rational manner and sees no benefit from this choice, either
perceived or actual, the shareholder may exercise apathy and not put the effort into voting
(Cole 2003). Similarly, the free rider problem stems from the realization that a shareholder
can benefit by simply relying on the actions of other shareholders, which in turn,
undermines the incentive for shareholders to take action on their own (Fairfax 2009). Cole
(2003) give the example of two shareholders with equal percentages of ownership in a
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company; each shareholder could invest a modest sum, say $25,000 to research the
corporate ballot issues and still increase their shareholder value. However, each would
prefer that the other make the research expense and gain a free ride on the information
produced by the other. Because shareholders benefit collectively, on a per share basis, each
individual shareholder has the incentive to let another shareholder undertake the
information gathering costs associated with voting. This also relates to the Downsian
analysis of shareholder voting (Edelan 2013).
Mark Latham, a financial economist and founder of VoterMedia.org, started
writing about issues of rational apathy and the free rider problem within corporate
governance in the late 1990s. Latham envisioned that the Internet and innovative
technology access would transform the landscape of shareholder engagement and provide
vehicles to combat rational apathy and the free rider problem. Latham believes that the
hurdles to collective action can be overcome to help shareholders monitor and hold
corporate management accountable to shareholders (Latham 1999). Latham’s thought
leadership was the basis for the development of ProxyDemocracy.org. Many other
researchers and practitioners have written about the need to find solutions to overcome the
barriers to collective action (Gulinello 2010, Eiben 2009, 2012, Fairfax 2009). The SEC
now legally allows the use of electronic shareholder forums and virtual participation in
shareholder meetings to provide both alternative means to gather information and more
effectively participate in corporate elections.
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3.3 Effect of the Internet on Proxy Voting
Investors have been able to vote proxies on the Internet since 1998 when ADP, the
firm that managed the mailing of hard-copy proxies for most large U.S. corporations,
launched www.proxyvote.com (Latham 2000). Broadridge now administers this site, and
there exist other means of transmitting proxy votes through the Internet by smaller firms.
The SEC’s universal e-proxy rules approved in 2007 allow companies the additional
option to either send the full package of proxy materials to a shareholder or simply just a
notice with proxy materials posted on a publically accessible website. Sites like
proxyvote.com and the subsequent e-proxy rules allow shareholders to access their proxy
materials by entering the control number that they receive on the notice from the premeeting disclosure documents. On this site, users can view materials and sign for future
electronic delivery of all materials.
Recent advances in technology can certainly play a role in facilitating this
engagement, but some argue that the rules and regulations governing corporate elections
have not advanced at the pace necessary to facilitate an efficient and effective system. The
current system of voting online discourages shareholders from participating because the
it’s not being used in the ways that most people interact with the Internet – namely to
aggregate and customize information in a format most convenient to the shareholder
(Eiben 2012). Larry Eiben, a co-founder of Moxy Vote, made a comparison between the
current proxy voting process and Netflix by painting this picture: imagine if Netflix did not
let its users aggregate information about their preferences for movies but instead required a
user to first go online to order an individual movie when desired and then refused to let
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users maintain lists of saved preferences to refer to when they are thinking about their next
selection or to see what others with similar preferences to theirs are watching. This would
not be viewed as an efficient system given the type of technology we have today; however,
this is essentially how the online proxy voting process works for retail investors.
The main benefits of transitioning to using the Internet are the potential cost
reductions from mailing proxy documents to eligible shareholders (Cole 2003). In 2008,
the SEC adopted rules that facilitate the use of electronic shareholder forums (Fairfax
2009). Proxy rules typically require that solicitation of proxies be accompanied by filing a
proxy statement, which means it needs to be distributed to all shareholders, which is costly,
expensive and cumbersome for shareholders. These amendments allow communication in
electronic forums to be exempt form these proxy rules; this facilitates better
communications not only among shareholders, but it also fosters genuine dialogue between
corporations and their shareholders that can be more beneficial than just corporate
elections. The use of electronic shareholder forums also lowers the cost to collective action
so that shareholders can assess other shareholders’ opinions on various actions but also
enable shareholders to cultivate coalitions around specific issues as they arise. The
drawbacks to electronic shareholder forums involve the voluntary nature of hosting or
engaging in a forum, the risk that these forums could just turn into chat rooms be infiltrated
by spam or unrelated posts if not carefully monitored, both of which reduce the value
gained by users (Smith 2008). Also, these forums may actually stifle communication
among shareholders and companies since corporations cold avoid interacting with
shareholder by ignoring emails; they cannot avoid addressing questions if they are posed in
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person at a meeting (Fairfax 2009).
Examples of electronic shareholder forums include The Shareholder Forum, Moxy
Vote, which allowed shareholders, activists and advocate organizations to share
information regarding issues of upcoming corporate elections and the United States Proxy
Exchange, which allowed shareholders to voluntarily represent one another at shareholder
meetings given geographical constraints.
3.4 Proxy Voting, Corporate Sustainability, and Climate Change
There exists a need for shareholders to have a voice in the boardroom especially in
light of the financial crisis in 2008 and now with risks of climate change and fossil fuel
volatility starting to have an effect on shareholder value (Covington and Rogers 2015,
Gelles 2016). Many organizations including Ceres, As You Sow, the Croatan Institute, the
UN Principles for Responsible Investing, and the Forum for Sustainable and Responsible
Investment (commonly referred to as US SIF) collect data about what companies are doing
to invest in sustainability which will be a guiding force to protecting shareholder value
from the risks of climate change (Ceres 2015, Electris et al. 2014, As You Sow 2015, US
SIF 2015, Deutsche Bank Group 2012).
Having a voice in the boardroom is important for both institutional and retail
investors. Analysis from Proxy Insight of the 2015 proxy season revealed that many of the
world’s largest investment management firms including Vanguard, BlackRock, and
Goldman Sachs voted with corporate management 90 percent of the time (Havelock 2015).
This raises concerns about whether these institutional investors are acting on the best
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interests of their clients. Additionally, a joint study in 2011 from the Ceres Investor
Network on Climate Risk (INCR) found that some of these same funds did not display the
type of voting behavior on proposals related to climate change that they committed to
(Fleming 2012). This came after the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission issued
formal guidance in 2010 requiring publicly traded companies to disclose material climate
risks in their financial filings. From the retail investor perspective, a study in 2015 by the
Brunswick Group surveying 801 retail investors4 found that 77 percent indicate they feel
that U.S. companies are holding more cash than ever on their balance sheets and should be
doing more to give back to shareholders. Additionally, 74 percent of respondents agreed
that shareholder activism adds value to companies by pushing corporate management to
make key decisions they might not be willing to make otherwise (Brunswick Group 2015).
Despite inaction by some institutional investors, many progressive institutional
investors have been paving the way for the integration of environmental, social and
governance (ESG) factors in corporate elections. These investors include investment firms
like Walden Asset Management and Boston Common Asset Management; mutual fund
companies such as Calvert Investments and Domini Social investments; foundations and
faith based investors including members of the Interfaith Center for Corporate
Responsibility (ICCR); municipal and state pension funds including CalPERS, CalSTRS,
New York State, New York City, the State of Connecticut, and the State of Vermont; and
trade unions such as the ALF-CIO and AFSCME (Smith 2016, Ceres 2014).	
  Many of these
investors propose shareholder resolutions to bring specific issues onto a company’s
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  

4
Retail investors were defined as individual investors that actively trade stocks, mutual funds, bonds, etc. outside of
retirement funds or real estate investments, and who play an active role in decision-making about their investments.
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election ballot. Under the environmental category, climate change has taken center stage
with proposal related to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction strategies, energy
efficiency and renewable energy goals. For example, Walden Asset Management
encourages companies to adopt robust climate policies and science-based GHG goals,
consistent with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports. Other
prominent environmental issues include water risk, hydraulic fracturing, use of toxic
materials, recycling and waste management. A few examples of successful engagement
with companies include Qualcomm’s announcement of a new target of 30 percent absolute
reduction in GHG emissions from global operations relative by 2025 relative to 2014
levels; Costco Wholesale committing to keeping GHG emissions growth to less than sales
growth over the next 5 years with links to both IPCC standards and reporting to CDP, a
leading global repository of corporate responses to climate risk; and PNC Financial
Services adopting a more stringent mountain top removal financing policy and an
enhanced due diligence process in financing high-risk sectors that includes internal
environmental stress tests (Smith 2016). These types of shareholder resolutions are on the
rise as seen by figure 4 from a recent report by Ceres and FundVotes, and figure 5 from the
Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility’s member base of resolutions. This means
that shareholders, if they choose to vote, will see these resolutions on their ballot and can
signal to companies that they indeed want greater disclosure and action towards addressing
the risks from climate change.
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Figure 4. Shareholder Resolutions Related to Climate Change. (Ceres 2015)

	
  
Figure 5. Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility Member Resolutions. (ICCR 2016)

Social topics addressed by investors include: fostering best practices with equal
employment opportunity policies, human rights risk assessment and management, political
spending and lobbying transparency, and labor standards throughout company supply
chains. Governance issues addressed by investors include the right to nominate directors
(known as proxy access), the separation of the Board Chair and CEO roles, and board
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composition diversity.
Investors in other countries, most notably Canada and the UK, are also leading the
charge on incorporating sustainability and climate change issues onto the corporate ballot.
Suncor Energy Inc, a Canadian integrated energy company, actually recommended that
voters approve a shareholder resolution that Suncor provide ongoing reporting on how it is
assessing and ensuring long-term corporate resilience in a future low-carbon economy
(Suncor Energy 2016).5 This is the result of long-term engagement by shareholders with
the company, but it is groundbreaking that the company itself is bringing the issue of
resilience in a future low-carbon economy to shareholders.
From this literature review, we have seen that the proxy voting process is
information intensive, and that retail investors face issues of rational apathy and the free
rider problem as barriers to voting. The Internet holds promise for improving the way that
investors can gather information and more effectively participate in the proxy process.
Additionally, investors, especially institutional investors, are starting to make more impact
with their investments through shareholder resolutions related to climate change,
sustainability and social responsibility. The next section will unpack the case studies of the
three websites chosen for analysis in this research.

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
5

The full resolution states: Be it resolved that: “Suncor provide ongoing reporting on how it is assessing, and ensuring,
long-term corporate resilience in a future low-carbon economy. Specifically, reporting could be stand-alone or integrated
into current company reporting mechanisms and could address Suncor’s technology pipeline, emission reduction targets
and performance, innovation and energy diversification strategies, provide a narrative on any stress-testing done against
external low carbon scenarios (e.g. IEA’s 450 and 2¹C Scenarios), and other relevant strategies.”
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4. Case Studies
This section reviews case studies for three different websites originally catered to
retail investors to help individual essentially outsource their voting decisions to institutions
or activist groups they trust. For each case study, there are subsections detailing the site’s
primary functions, user base, financing and revenue generation, and a brief discussion of
the hurdles each site faced along the way.
4.1 Moxy Vote
Site Functions
1) Research and information exchange
Users could research companies to view upcoming shareholder meetings and online
voting duration. Users could input the control number from their proxy ballot or search by
individual companies. Company pages displayed how many shareholder and board
proposals were on the ballot and which board members were up for reelection. Users could
also see opinions from activist shareholders and advocacy organizations to inform their
voting decisions (see Appendix A for homepage).

2) Voting preference customization and user directed electronic voting
In addition to providing a platform of information exchange, users of Moxy Vote
could create customized voting profiles based on their own opinions and those informed by
input from advocate and activist organizations. For example, a user could align with the
voting preferences of a particular advocate group or mutual fund and create a hierarchy for
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voting (i.e. vote as Sierra Club, if Sierra Club has not posted an opinion on a particular
issue, vote as the Humane Society). When the annual shareholder meeting approached for
a stock in a user’s portfolio, users could vote online directly through Moxy Vote or tell
their brokerage firm to direct the stocks they own to Moxy Vote’s voting platform. The
process was relatively straightforward with a one-time set-up. This small investment in
time could end up being of long-lasting value to the user. This voting process is a potential
solution to rational apathy and the free rider problem by making it easy for a user to
transact a vote and taking away a bit of the burden of deciding how to vote in an
information-rich world. When Moxy Vote closed in 2012, investors had voted 30,000,000
shares through the site. Shareholder activist, Jim McRitchie, claims that Moxy Vote
provided the closest version yet to a system of client directed voting (CDV) (Kissane
2007). This term was coined in 2006 by Stephen Norman, former Secretary and Corporate
Governance Officer at American Express who worked on the topic with the NYSE’s Proxy
Working Group; CDV is seen as a method to encourage greater participation from retail
investors, but support for CDV has wavered as seen in discussions on Harvard Law
School’s Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation (Hirst 2010, Wilcox
2010, McRitchie 2010).

3) Crowdsourcing of shareholder activism
Moxy Vote allowed activist shareholders including hedge funds, unions and
nonprofit organizations, to garner support online from individual shareholders by putting
their opinions on the site for individual investors to see (Blumenthal 2012). These
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shareholders could see how activist groups voted on proxy issues such as mergers and
acquisitions and board seats. One such example revolved around Google’s acquisition of
ON2 Technologies (ON2) in 2009. As a Bloomberg BusinessWeek article documents,
Google announced the acquisition of the video compression software company before
securing approval by shareholders. A group of investors, angered by what they felt was an
undervalued offer, started directing investors to Moxy Vote to advocate for a better
valuation of ON2’s shares. The push seemed successful, given that the merger failed to
pass in its initial shareholder meeting, causing Google to add 15 cents per share to its offer.
This boosted the valuation from an initial bid of $106 million to $133 million, a total
increase of $18 million. It also gave shareholders more time to consider the merger
(Bogoslow 2010). Shareholders in this case did not exclusively credit Moxy Vote for the
achievement, but John Marcoux, who at the time owned nearly one million shares of ON2
and led the efforts to collaborate with other investors on Moxy Vote, gave praise to the
platform that allowed shareholders to “come together and speak our voice”. Marcoux said
that that Moxy Vote’s role in their efforts “got the attention of Google that this [deal]
wasn’t going to pass unless [Google] did something” (Bogoslow 2010).

User Base
Moxy Vote’s initial target user base included both retail investors who would sign
up as registered users or subscribers and activist organizations that could register as
advocates on the site. Moxy Vote’s user base reached a milestone in 2011 with 5,000
registered users and approximately 40 advocates then the user base grew to approximately
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200,000 registered users or subscribers and 56 advocates by the time it ceased operations
in 2012 (Schlegel 2016).
Moxy Vote had staff members tracking all of these metrics. Mark Schlegel, one of
Moxy Vote’s co-founders, mentioned that Moxy Vote started with the goal of pooling
individual who were passionate about various issues including the environment, animal
welfare, labor relations, and providing a platform for them to vote altogether. Founders of
Moxy Vote thought that this user base would increase enough so that the site could easily
entice activist organizations including Sierra Club, the Humane Society and others to pay
to participate on the site as advocates so that they can provide useful information to these
passionate votes.
In attempts to boost the user base early on, Moxy Vote partnered with Care2.com
and Change.org. Moxy Vote was able to track growth in the user base for letters that were
sent out and also noted the organic growth from the promotion, but it ultimately did not
gain the following from those partnerships that it projected.
Moxy Vote found out that finding people who own shares in stocks who are also
passionate about issues was quite difficult. Moxy Vote started getting users who were not
shareholders, but who were passionate about issues to provide information. Of the 197,000
users, only a portion were shareholders; the rest of the users could sign letters to
companies around issues they cared about. When Moxy Vote closed in 2012, it had sent 64
letters to management with a collective 275,000 signatures on those letters. Notable in this
letter writing campaign was in 2012, when as a result of a letter writing campaign from
Moxy Vote users, Johnson and Johnson (J&J) signed an agreement with Moxy Vote that it
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would compensate Moxy Vote for all the votes, per ballot, that came through the site. This
goes against traditional theory that corporations do not encourage shareholders to vote
beyond the minimum SEC compliance standards unless there is a contested election. J&J
recognized that it would have to deal with adverse shareholders at any rate, and the
arrangement that J&J made with Moxy Vote allowed representatives from the company to
communicate with users of Moxy Vote who signed letters, improving the overall dialogue
between the company and its stakeholders.

Financing and Revenue Generation
The website was initially backed with $2 million of seed funding from the owners
of TFS Capital who collectively funded the project. Much of this initial funding was spent
to develop the technology to connect to brokerage firms. This amount, however, is
miniscule compared the amount of money that proxy advisory firms like ISS and Glass
Lewis spend to develop their systems. The Moxy Vote funders invested a total of $4.5
million into the venture. To generate ongoing revenue for the site, Moxy Vote charged fees
to institutions with an interest in reaching users of the site. These institutions included
public companies, activist hedge funds and pension funds who wanted to lobby for votes
from retail investors and individual shareholders (Kerber 2012).
In another attempt to generate revenue, Moxy Vote ran a pilot program with SRI
(socially responsible investment) and ESG (environmental, social and governance) wealth
managers to vote their proxies for them, essentially providing proxy advisory services
outside of ISS and Glass Lewis. The pilot ran its course, but in the end, the wealth
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managers decided to move in a different direction from working with Moxy Vote.

Regulatory Hurdles: Why Moxy Vote Ceased Operations
Moxy Vote worked closely with SEC staff through the initial start-up and
expansion of the site; however, Moxy Vote ended up facing barriers with regulations that
prevented the long-term viability of the site. This led to the decision to suspend operations
in July 2012. There were two main regulatory considerations: 1) the classification of the
company in the context of proxy and financial advisors and 2) the costs related to voting
transactions fees.
In the first regulatory consideration, despite efforts to clarify Moxy Vote’s role, the
company ultimately found that it did not fit any of the classifications of investment
advisors recognized by the SEC since it was an aggregator of information and did not
receive compensation for its advisory services. Since it did not fit strongly into any of the
classifications some brokerage firms were not compelled not pass along shareholder ballots
to the site, stating that they would do so when required by an SEC ruling. Individual
shareholders have no legal grounds to compel their brokers to deliver ballots electronically
to Internet voting platforms. This meant that some users would not be able to vote
electronically through Moxy Vote. This discrepancy largely depended on how these firms
read the regulations, even though Moxy Vote sent the ballot through the same secure
system as the individual voter.
In the second regulatory consideration, Schlegel made an analogy – imagine an
institutional investor who owns a company in 1000 different client accounts; brokerages
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firms charge one flat fee for one ballot for the institutional investor. Contrasting this, Moxy
Vote has 1000 users who all own the same company; brokerage firms would not pool the
ballots of Moxy Vote users and would charge that same flat fee for each individual ballot
for each individual users of the site. Since Moxy Vote wanted to remain a free service to
its registered users (different from advocates), the site paid the fees and hoped that
revenue generated from the advocates would offset the fees.
As Moxy Vote became more successful in attracting users, the site had to pay a
growing amount in transaction fees to brokerage firms that were not reimbursed by public
companies. In essence, as Jim McRitchie, shareholder-activist and publisher of
Corpgov.net stated, "The more successful Moxy Vote was at getting people to vote on their
platform, the more money they lost” (McRitchie 2015). For institutional brokers, these
transaction fees are nominal in comparison with the fees they generate from providing
proxy voting advice. Moxy Vote founders felt these fees should be reimbursed by the
companies, or should not even be charged at all to a site like Moxy Vote, which was
claiming to be a neutral aggregator of information.
After Moxy Vote ceased operations, co-founder Larry Eiben filed a petition with
the SEC seeking to create a new category of investment advisor called the “neutral Internet
voting platform”; this platform category would have helped Moxy Vote and similar sites
avoid the transaction fees it owed to proxy broker services in order to transact votes on
behalf of its users. Schlegel mentioned that as they dug deeper into the regulations, they
found that many of them were put into place over 40 years ago. Being well before the
Internet became mainstream, regulators and rule makers at the time had no concept that
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there would be a more efficient way to submit their proxy vote. Schlegel also
acknowledged when Moxy Vote was active, changing rules to make it more efficient for
retail investors to transact their votes probably was not high on the priority list of those at
the SEC. Moxy Vote’s founders previously worked in the finance field and were easily
able to secure financial backing to keep pushing for changes in regulations. It inevitably
became too challenging to keep supporting this advocacy, however, when the SEC didn’t
appear to be moving on any action that would benefit Moxy Vote.
No action ever came from Larry Eiben’s petition to the SEC in 2012. Schlegel
mentioned that there have been multiple roundtable discussions with the SEC, NYSE and
other committees that oversee the proxy voting process since Moxy Vote closed down. He
lamented, however, that they often involve the same people and same discussions that fail
to move forward on any item that would help an electronic shareholder forum like Moxy
Vote be successful in the future. The concern of many of these committees and panels is
not focused on the individual and retail shareholder, but the institutional investors.
Moxy Vote began as a good business idea that could also do some good; the
founders thought they saw a crossroads of being able to make a livelihood while pushing
the ball forward on promoting engagement of shareowners in exercising their voting
power, their corporate equivalent to democracy. Moxy Vote wanted to bring illumination
to the process of rallying the retail vote and to “empower small shareholders to effect
change” (Bernard 2010). Until regulatory hurdles are overcome or circumvent, it will be
difficult for a website with similar functionality to Moxy Vote to be able to scale to the
point needed to sustain revenue.
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4.2 United States Proxy Exchange (USPX)
Site Functions
USPX provided users with letter and proposal templates to submit shareholder
resolutions to companies. It also provided a way for users to connect with one another and
attend annual meetings on behalf of other users of the website to directly cast their vote. In
2006, Holton published a proposal in the Financial Analysts Journal to allow small
shareholders to assign their proxy voting rights to anyone they wished (Kerber 2011). This
would help address the free rider problem by allowing a means for people to pass their
votes on to actual individuals who can share with them the result of their actions, not just a
vote through a system where they may not know the outcome of their votes. The site
functioned well by providing commentary on certain issues; one example is an attempt of
Goldman Sachs Group to sell pre-IPO shares of Facebook to wealthy investors ahead of
the anticipated IPO. Companies are supposed to file public disclosure if they have more
than 500 shareholders, so this arrangement would be a way around this requirement.
Holton wrote in a newsletter to USPX members that the SEC should block this
arrangement as a violation of these disclosure rules. Goldman subsequently limited its
private placement of these pre-IPO shares citing, “intense media coverage” (Kerber 2011).
USPX also worked to send several sets of comments to the SEC including model
shareholder proposals for proxy access, shareholder guidelines for say-on-pay voting, and
comments to specific corporate cases.
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User Base, Financing, Revenue Generation, and Governance
In 2011, USPX had an email list of about 250 people. USPX was completely
volunteer run with Holton leading the helm. Holton came from a quantitative background
and was seeking to “reverse engineer what Wall Street” was doing (Kerber 2011).

Management Capacity: Why USPX Ceased Operations
In 2012, USPX ceased central operations. The intent was to take a pause for 18-24
months to re-evaluate the direction of the website. The site was always run on a volunteer
basis with a volunteer director and volunteer board. Holton ran his own consulting practice
on financial risk management, which suffered because of the demands of running USPX
(McRitchie 2012). USPX was decentralized in principle, but the site relied on Holton to
keep the momentum going. Similar to Moxy Vote, USPX was seeking to put “new power
in the hands of retail investors” who have the potential to reshape “the relationship
between companies and their shareholders” through the use of online communications
(Kerber 2011). "The system has been broken for 100 years," said Holton, "but that's no
reason to keep it broken" (Zweig 2012). At the time this case study was written, the USPX
webpage does not load, and it appears that the site never came back after its pause in 2012.
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4.3 ProxyDemocracy.org
Site Functions
1) General news and information about proxy voting for individual investors
ProxyDemocracy has a section where users can view general news and information
about proxy voting. Site moderators posted some articles, and some were linked in through
other blogs, news sources and user-created content. The news sections have not been
updated since 2013. There is also a section for users to learn about proxy voting in general
and a few of the key issues involved in shareholder elections.

2) Individual company ballot information and alerts of upcoming meetings
ProxyDemocracy users can create a profile on the site and sign up to receive alerts
of upcoming shareholder meetings. This, in combination with the information about proxy
voting, can help combat rational apathy and the free rider problem by reminding the user to
vote, and making the information gathering a bit easier. Users can search by individual
companies to view the ballot information for a particular meeting including what board
members are up for election and key shareholder proposals. ProxyDemocracy tracks
meetings for 13,000 individual companies.

3) Mutual fund voting records and activism profiles
Users can learn about mutual fund voting records and see ProxyDemocracy’s
activism profile, which provides an algorithmic rating system based on a mutual fund’s
voting record. To create the activism profiles, ProxyDemocracy scrapes NPX filings from
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the SEC’s database of mutual funds proxy voting records, and these filings are run through
an algorithm that creates the fund’s activism profile seen on the site. This profile provides
quantitative percentiles and rankings as well as a graphic display of the activism footprint.
The activism profile is based on four key areas related to issues addressed in proxy voting:
Directors, Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance, and Corporate Impact. This
allows users to see how mutual funds compare to one another in addressing certain
corporate governance issues or to see if a particular mutual fund they own aligns with the
values of the shareholders. ProxyDemocracy provides information and activism profiles
about 60 fund families and 182 mutual funds.

User Base
ProxyDemocracy’s initial target audience was retail investors (Eggers 2008a). The
site targets information and functionalities for shareholders of individual companies and
mutual fund owners. In an interview with Andy Eggers, the founder of the site, he
mentioned his target user base as people who care about social issues or who may think
that there is a lot of corporate malfeasance, for example, that the levels of corporate
compensation are too high. The site was designed for someone who wants to make
decisions about their proxy votes, but does not want to do all the work to keep up to date
with everything in the shareholder advocacy universe. In a way, ProxyDemocracy could
serve like a political party for investors. The hope was that “broader and more informed
participation will not only help investors safeguard their own investments, but also bring
about economically and socially beneficial change" (Odell 2008).
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Financing, Revenue Generation, and Governance
ProxyDemocracy received initial funding from the Panta Rhea Foundation, the
Nathan Cummings Foundation, the V. Kann Rasmussen Foundation, the General Service
Foundation and the Noyes Foundation (ProxyDemocracy.org 2008). The site worked on a
very minimal structure with Eggers leading the strategic direction along with input from
the small board of directors. Eggers shared website development responsibilities with
Anandaroop Roy, a web developer and designer based in New York City. In total, the site
raised less than $200,000, mostly in increments of $10,000-$30,000.
The board of directors was first composed of Mark Orlowski, the Executive
Director and Founder of the Sustainable Endowments Institute; Nicco Mele, the cofounder of Echo and Company; and Mark Latham, the director of VoterMedia.org. These
board members had the necessary knowledge and connections to help ProxyDemocracy
gain initial popularity. ProxyDemocracy still exists but is now under management of the
Sustainable Endowments Institute in Boston. ProxyDemocracy began as an idea likened to
being a political party for investors – to provide easier access to information in a format
that is more user friendly and engaging than what is provided by companies and the proxy
advisors they use to solicit votes.

5. Discussion and Conclusions
From these case studies, there are apparent hurdles to implementing an effective
website catered to the needs of retail investors, but there exist ample opportunities to
overcome these hurdles. Table 1 summarizes the comparison between the three case
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studies, and next I will unpack some of hurdles of the sites as well as the subsequent
opportunities. These two aspects are incorporated into the overall recommendations for
ProxyDemocracy in the next section.

Website  

Moxy  Vote  

USPX  

ProxyDemocracy  

Years  Active  

2009-‐2012  

2004-‐2012  

2006-‐Current  

Site  Functions  

Information  exchange    
Proxy  voting  platform  

Shareholder  resolution  training  
Social  network  for  corporate  meetings  

Information  exchange  
Activism  profiles  for  mutual  funds  

User  Base  

200,000  users,  retail  investors  
56  advocate  organizations  

250  users,  retail  investors  

Unclear  amount,  retail  investors  

Management  

For  profit  
10  paid  staff  

Volunteer-‐run  
1  volunteer  director  

Non  profit  
2  paid  staff  

Strengths  

Strong  user  base  
Connection  with  Broadridge  
Expertise  of  staff  in  finance  

Mission  driven    
Knowledge  &  expertise  of  director  
Connections  with  legal  advisors  

Innovative  concept  
Technical  expertise  of  staff  
Website  design  &  automated  algorithm  

Hurdles  

Regulatory  issues  
Inability  to  generate  revenue  
Operating  expenses  

Management  capacity  
Small  user  base  
Limited  functionality  

Grant  dependent  
Unclear  target  user  and  website  traffic  
Outdated  appearance  

Table 1. Comparative Summary of Case Studies. Robin Miller, 2015.

	
  

5.1 Hurdles
The major hurdles fall into a few different themes: regulatory concerns, funding
and financing, and the fragmented system of websites. Many of these hurdles exist because
the rules on proxy voting were developed long before the mainstream adoption of the
Internet; it appears that the SEC has failed to adequately keep up with adapting its rules to
the changing environment.
Regarding regulatory hurdles, the adoption of a neutral voting platform by the SEC
would greatly aid in allowing a website with a customized voting platform to operate a
sustainable business model. Requiring greater transparency on the part of the proxy
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advisors’ methodologies and restricting the ability of proxy advisors to provide consulting
services to issuers would help the entire proxy system avoid conflicts of interest and
promote greater accessibility to and transparency of information (Schouten 2010).
Even though each of the websites had a different management structure and
operating model, none of them developed a successful revenue model with diversified
revenue streams. Moxy Vote relied on receiving significant seed funding from the founders,
but this funding was quickly used in the website development, and the revenue streams
from the advocate organizations was not enough to keep up with the transaction costs per
ballot. USPX was completely volunteer managed so although its mission was serving a
needed purpose, the volunteer nature of the site would probably never have scaled much
beyond its user base. ProxyDemocracy has historically been grant funded, but even then, it
has not seen any recent attention and remains outdated in design and content.
Having several websites all catered to encouraging the retail investor vote resulted
in a fragmented market. This caused a bit of tension among the sites as they were all
iterating around the time period. Schlegel mentioned that Moxy Vote had a relationship
with the other sites that landed somewhere between collaboration and competition. Moxy
Vote founders had conversations with Eggers of ProxyDemocracy, as well as the founders
of Shareowners.org and Holton from the United States Proxy Exchange. Schlegel said that
there always remained challenges of how to integrate and support one another. Moxy Vote
was the only for-profit organization working in the space, which caused skepticism of the
site by the other groups, who were largely based on voluntary efforts or organized into
nonprofit organizations. Although they were all working to push the ball forward on
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greater involvement of shareowners in the proxy voting process, the groups approached the
task from different angles. Inevitably, it became very challenging to figure out how to
bridge the gap for all organizations to mutually benefit. How could these nonprofit and
volunteer ventures adequately explain being in the same sandbox as the for-profit Moxy
Vote? From Eggers’ perspective, he found it difficult to partner with other sites whose
missions were not completely aligned with ProxyDemocracy. Upon later reflection, he said
the “thought they were going to lose their lunch, but there was no lunch to lose” speaking
to the small pool of investors these sites could potentially attract (Eggers 2015). Eggers did
not initial realize just how difficult it would be to get investors interested in doing
something about proxy voting. He expressed a sense of overenthusiasm about how the
Internet would solve issues of engagement and activism. Eggers mentioned that he learned
that shareholder advocacy, and especially engaging individual shareholders, involves much
more than creating elegant algorithms and using technology. Effective shareholder
engagement takes “elbow grease” in to overcome the obstacles of rational apathy and the
free rider problem. There is not a lot of natural connection between individual
shareholders, which begs the questions, who would want to be on a social network site for
shareholders?
5.2 Opportunities
These hurdles can be reframed as opportunities to strengthen and improve the
viability or ProxyDemocracy going forward. The major opportunities lie in thinking
creatively about revenue streams, aligning more closely with progressive institutional
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investors, and being aware of the impending wealth transfer to millenials.
One potential solution to diversifying revenue streams that Schlegel proposed was
that part of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)’s regulation specifies a paper reduction
fee remitted to the brokerage firm for shareholders who elect to receive their proxy
information electronically. This amount ranges from 6 cents to 25 cents per ballot
depending on the account size of the investor (Deutsche Bank 2014). This accounts for
electronic delivery being more efficient and requiring less printing and processing of
paperwork. If a proxy voting site could prove that it encouraged its users to switch to
receiving their proxy notices electronically, what is preventing that site from sharing the
reduction fee remission with the brokerage firm? This source of revenue could offset the
voting transaction fees and contribute to a more viable business model. Additionally, these
sites were operating during the earlier periods of social media and crowd funding and did
not take advantage of these opportunities to both spread the message of the site and attract
additional investment.
Aligning with progressive institutional investors and other key partners could also
support the bottom line and help in the scaling of a proxy voting site for retail investors.
Moxy Vote developed working relationships early on with the SEC and brokerage firms in
attempts to prove the concept and make Moxy Vote function. Schlegel also acknowledged
that Moxy Vote owed much of is success to the relationship it developed with Broadridge
to transact votes and gain access to its database. Solidifying a significant brokerage firm
partner will be key to success for future endeavors. Eggers suggested that a proxy voting
site like ProxyDemocracy might be even more effective as a think tank for socially
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responsible investment (SRI) firms and asset managers focused on environmental, social
and governance (ESG) integration to find out what is material to retail investors voting
decisions. This is especially important to think about with the growing number of
shareholder resolutions related to climate change and social issues. Eggers kept
ProxyDemocracy independent of these funds to avoid a conflict of interest since the site
evaluates them through its activism profiles; however, there could be creative ways of
thinking through partnerships with these firms towards a shared goal of greater retail voter
participation. On a final note related to collaboration with institutional investors, Eggers
suggested that having college and university endowment and nonprofit foundation voting
records on ProxyDemocracy could be a good way to increase the data and reach of the site.
The last opportunity to glean from these case studies is that the decision-making
power of investments will soon transfer to a new generation: millennials. Schlegel (2016)
noted that from his experience at TFS Capital, more and more individuals entering the
workforce and earning income want match their values with their investments. Millennials,
in his view, often do not even think twice about separating their values from the
investments they make. As millennials inherit the wealth of their families and the inherent
shareholder voting power, there may be an opportunity to engage these investors through
ProxyDemocracy.
Now that that the major hurdles and opportunities have been identified from the
three case studies, especially focusing on the strengths and weaknesses of each website, the
next section will detail specific recommendations for strengthening and increasing the
viability of ProxyDemocracy going forward.
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6. Recommendations for ProxyDemocracy
In order to move beyond its self-sustaining state, ProxyDemocracy can make
strategic improvements to increase its efficacy. In the short-term, ProxyDemocracy should
conduct market research to identify a core user base; develop a set of internal materials
including a clear vision, stakeholder analysis and financial plan; and modernize the website.
It should continue to build its advisory board, which currently consists of several experts in
corporate governance and sustainable investing. Maintaining the site under the nonprofit
status of the SEI will allow the site to keep providing its educational content.
At the long-term scale, ProxyDemocracy needs to develop a sustainable operating
model. An option could be to partner with a similar organization like As You Sow (AYS),
a nonprofit organization based in San Francisco, which completes a comprehensive annual
report called Proxy Preview. There have been initial conversations between SEI and AYS
to develop up a proxy voting platform similar to what Moxy Vote offered that would
operate as a social enterprise. Revenue could come from companies who wish to use the
service to garner votes from retail shareholders. One key idea for this incarnation is to
develop a feedback loop so when a user votes through the platform, the user receives a
notification after proxy season ends with the results of the elections for the companies they
submitted votes for. This would be a crucial piece in addressing rational apathy and the
free rider problem with proxy voting and retail investors.
It should also increase the universe of mutual funds featured on the site, and even
work to include proxy voting records of other types of institutions like college and
university endowments. Table 2 provides a summary of these recommendations.
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What  

Action  Steps  

Market  Research  

Goal  of  
completion  
May  2016  

•

Develop  and  implement  survey  for  
current/potential  PD  users  
Analyze  results  

Internal  Materials  

•
•
•

Finish  brief  visioning  document  
Stakeholder  mapping/analysis  
Financial  plan/grant  writing  

May  2016  
May  2016  
May  2016  

Website  
Development  

•
•
•

Solidify  developer  
Complete  Tier  1  and  Tier  2  improvements  
Back-‐end  upload  feature  

May  2016  
July  2016  
July  2016  

Advisory  Board  

•
•
•

Follow-‐up  with  Johnson  &  Johnson  
Update  Advisory  Board  spreadsheet  
Hold  conference  call  with  current  members  

May  2016  
Ongoing  
June  2016  

Partnerships  and  
Strategy  

•
•
•
•

Strategy  meeting  in  NYC  
Outreach  to  endowments/foundations    
Explore  ProxyDemocracy  the  voting  service  
Explore  partnerships  with  ESG/SRI  funds  

April  2016  
June  2016  
July  2016  
July  2016  

•

  

June  2016  

Table 2. Summary of Recommendations for ProxyDemocracy. Robin Miller, 2015

7. Opportunities for Future Research
There were a few limitations to this research that can be overcome in future
research endeavors. The founder of the United States Proxy Exchange could not be reached
for interview, which contributes to the brevity of that case study. Although there are many
different organizations that develop proxy voting guidelines and track the results of each
proxy voting season, it is difficult to determine the efficacy of an individual investor’s vote.
The Croatan Institute is looking into the impact of equity engagement, and part of this
includes the proxy voting process (Electris et al. 2014). Determining this efficacy and
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impact will be important to integrate into further iterations of ProxyDemocracy and to the
contribution of research on both retail and institutional investors in the future. Schlegel
(2016) pointed out that its important to note that people in general are not completely
apathetic toward environmental, social and governance issues. For users of Moxy Vote, the
folks that were the most passionate about particular issues did not own those stocks and the
folks who were shareholders tended to be the least passionate. It is the pooling of these
interests that could really draw in synergy. Research into the synergy of shareholders and
non-shareholder around corporate environmental, social and governance could be a very
interesting topic.
It is important to remember that the shareholder vote is just one piece of
shareholder engagement and shareholder advocacy. Effective voting can signal to a
company that shareholders desire change or information access, and additionally
shareholder votes can often lead to beginning dialogue with a company. This dialogue is
what usually leads to material changes that can both improve shareholder value and
provide a path forward for action on sustainable and resilient practices.
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Appendix A
MOXY VOTE TIMELINE
2009

Moxy Vote launches with $2M seed funding

Nov 2009

Moxy Vote files this letter with the SEC

March 2010

Moxy Vote publishes this video

2011

Moxy Vote reaches 5,000 user milestone

July 2012

Moxy Vote shuts down with 200,000 (197,000) registered users and 56
advocate organizations posting voting advice

Aug 2012

Larry Eiben, initial backer of Moxy Vote, files a petition with the SEC to
create a new category of investment advisor called “neutral Internet voting
platform”

SCREENSHOT OF HOMEPAGE
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Appendix B
PROXY DEMOCRACY TIMELINE
July 2004

Andy Eggers starts ProxyDemocracy wordpress blog

July 2007

Alpha version of mutual fund database launched

2007

Officially founded! (according for FB page)

April 2008

Started blogging about FocusLists

May 2008

Origin of the Activism Rating

June 2009

Mark Latham gets seat on SEC Investor Advisory Committee, press release;
first meeting notes

March 2010

ProxyDemocracy featured in the NY Times

2010

ProxyDemocracy gets a facelift

November
2010

SEC Investor Advisory Committee terminated; did pass a resolution about
proxy voting transparency in Feb 2010

2012

New SEC Investor Advisory Committee created

2015

Sustainable Endowments Institute acquires ProxyDemocracy
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